

The Sydney Morning Herald.

"IN MODERATION PLACING ALL MY GLORY, WHILE TORIES CALL ME WHIG—AND WHIGS A TORY."

TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION.
Sydney, Fifteen Shillings per Quarter. Single Numbers, Sixpence. Country, Seventeen Shillings and Sixpence per Quarter.
Ten per cent. discount for payment in advance, and ten per cent. added if accounts are allowed to run over six months.

VOL. XIX.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 10 1845.

No. 2390.

CASH TERMS FOR ADVERTISEMENTS.

For one inch and under, Three Shillings, and One Shilling for every additional inch, for each insertion.

The only persons authorized to receive Money and Communications on account of the "SYDNEY MORNING HERALD" (except at the Office of Publication, Lower George-street, Sydney) are Mr. JOHN HARRIS, and Mr. W. BALL, Collectors, Sydney; Mr. JOSEPH HUNT, Balmain; Mr. T. M. SLOAN, Bathurst; Mr. LARSEN WHITE, Windsor; Mr. HUGH TAYLOR, Parramatta; Mr. A. W. LARSEN, Maitland and Nollibee; Mr. JOHN BROWN, Campbelltown; Mr. JOHN COLEMAN, Penrith; Mr. THOMAS W. FARMER, Deputy Postmaster, Wollongong; Mr. ROBERT CRAIG, Cabinetmaker, Goulburn; Mr. JOHN KIRK, Postmaster, Cessnock and Meriton; Mr. JOHN GRAY, Queenstown; Mr. THOMAS HORN, Deputy Postmaster, Singleton and Jersey Plains; Mr. WILLIAM PRITCHARD, Deputy Postmaster, Liverpool; Mr. JOHN LLOYD, Port Phillip; Mr. CAPTAIN THOM, Launceston and Van Diemen's Land; Mr. WILLIAM BARNARD ROOPE, Wellington, for Port Nicholson and Cook's Straits, New Zealand who are provided with Printed Receipts, with the written signatures of "KEMP AND FAIRFAX," who hereby give Notice that no other will be acknowledged for debts accruing from January 1, 1841.

The "SYDNEY MORNING HERALD" is Published every Morning (Sundays excepted); and the Quarters end the 31st March, 30th June, 30th September, and 31st December; at which periods only can Subscribers decline by giving Notice and paying the amount due to the end of the Current Quarter. Advertisements must specify on the face of them the number of times they are intended to be inserted, or they will be continued till countermanded, and charged to the party. No advertisements can be withdrawn after Eleven o'clock, a.m., but new ones will be received until Nine o'clock in the Evening. No verbal communications can be attended to, and all letters must be post-paid or they will not be taken in.

SPECIAL NOTICE.

THE Subscribers to this Paper, and the Public generally, are respectfully informed, that the following Rules are strictly adhered to—

In Sydney.—No new Subscribers will be received without one quarter being paid in advance, for which ten per cent. will be allowed; the subscription in advance being 13s.6d. per quarter.

In the Country.—No new Subscribers will be received without half-a-year being paid in advance, for which ten per cent. will be allowed; the subscription in advance being £1 11s. 6d. per half-year; and the Proprietors must be furnished at the time with a written undertaking that all future payments, both for subscription and charges of advertisements, shall be made in Sydney, or by the hands of an Agent.

In all cases, whether in Town or Country, the names of persons who be struck off the subscription list, when the arrears against them have stood over twelve months, and proceedings for recovering the amount due will be instituted.

Advertisements must be paid for previous to their insertion.

In all cases of Insolvency, when the party is a Subscriber to this Journal, the name is at once erased from the Subscriber's Book; and if he wish to take the paper in future he must comply with the rule affecting new Subscribers, and pay in advance.

PARAMATTA STEAMERS.

COMMERCIAL WHARF.
From Sydney, 9 a.m. From Parramatta, 7 a.m.
12 noon. 8 a.m.
4 p.m. 12 noon
ON SUNDAYS.
From Sydney, 9 a.m. From Parramatta, 7 a.m.
6 p.m. 5 p.m.

Fares reasonable.—FRUIT and other Freight at low rates; WOOD, at One Shilling a Bale; apply as under.

At Parramatta to Capt. Morris or Shorter, at Sydney to

JAS. PATTERSON, Manager.

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PARAMATTA STEAMER.

NATIVE.

THE times of starting the old packets

having been again altered to hours less convenient for the public, and with no other object than to injure the proprietors of the above favourite steam-packet.

Notice is respectfully given by the owners that they do not intend to make any deviation in their fixed hours of running; but, depending upon lower charges and regularity, they trust (notwithstanding this gratuitous opposition) to receive even increased support.

From Parramatta, 7 a.m. and 2 p.m.

From Sydney, half past 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.

Parramatta—Saloon, 1s. 6d. Steerage 9d.

Kissing Point—Saloon, 1s. Steerage 6d.

Bedlam Ferry—Saloon, 9d. Steerage 6d.

Kelly's Wharf, Sussex-street, December 28.

8751

STREAM TO BROUKE.

BOYD TOWN, MELBOURNE, AND LAUNCESTON.

THE first-class iron

steamer, G. Gilmore, commander, will leave Sydney for the above ports on Saturday, the 11th January instant, at ten o'clock in the morning. Shippers are requested to have their goods at the Wharf by six o'clock on Friday evening, 10th instant, and passengers' names should be given in at the Office on the same day, for clearance by the Water Police.

FRANCIS CLARKE, Manager.

Hunter River Steam Navigation Company, Sydney, January 3.

FOR PORT ALBERT, GIPPS LAND THE SCHOONER

THE CLARENCE.

70 tons register, Captain Jack, will sail in a few days, and return to this port without delay. For freight or passage apply on board.

JOHN THOM.

Flour Company's Wharf, January 8.

FOR HOBART TOWN DIRECT.

THE first-class Packet-Schooner

PHOEBE.

108 tons, will sail on TUESDAY, the 14th January. For freight or passage, apply on board, at Street's Wharf, Sussex-street; or to Mr. William Brown, corner of Sussex and Bathurst streets.

WILLIAM BROWN.

FOR LAUNCESTON DIRECT.

THE Brig WILLIAM

will sail on Tuesday, 14th instant. For freight or passage apply on board.

JOHN THOM.

Flour Company's Wharf, January 8.

NOTICE TO SHIPPERS OF WOOL AT NEWCASTLE.

FOR LONDON.

THE NEW BARQUE

CHANCE.

R. Roby, commander. For freight or passage, apply to Captain Roby, on board (at Newcastle), to F. B. METCALFE, or to J. B. METCALFE.

January 9.

FOR LONDON DIRECT.

THE last sailing first-class barque,

NEW YORK PACKET.

850 tons, Captain Hawkeley, now loading at the Circular Wharf. Has room for light freight, and cabin passengers only. Apply on board to Captain Hawkeley, or to

GRIFFITHS, GORE, AND CO.

Bent-street.

FOR LONDON.

WOOL AND CLOTH PASSENGERS ONLY.

THE First-Class Ship

EMILY.

580 tons, H. H. Greenes, Com-

mander, is now loading wool, and will sail on or before 31st January.

The Accommodations for Cabin Passengers are very superior, and a medical gentleman of the Royal Navy goes in the vessel as surgeon. For Freight or Passage apply on board, off Armagh's Wharf; or to

LYALL, SCOTT, AND CO., Agents.

FOR LONDON.

THE very fast-sailing first-

class ship

HERALD.

800 tons register, J. B. Coubo, Com-

mander. This vessel is now daily expect-

ed, and will immediately commence taking in cargo for the above port, and will have quick despatch. Apply to

GILCHRIST AND ALEXANDER, No. 700, George-street.

January 7.

FOR LONDON.

THE BARQUE

PARQUE HALL.

435 tons register, E. Goldsmith, Com-

mander. This ship, having one stern cabin and the next adjoining disengaged, offers a most de-

scribed opportunity for a family, and will sail positively on the 14th instant. Apply on board; or to

ROBERT TOWNS, or GILCHRIST AND ALEXANDER.

All accounts against this ship to be handed in, in duplicate, to the office of Messrs. Gil-

christ and Alexander, on or before Saturday, the 11th instant.

January 8.

LIVERPOOL.

FOR PASSENGERS ONLY.

THE Splendid A1 Ship

GARLAND GROVE.

600 tons register, John Robson, Com-

mander, will sail for Liverpool, on the 20th

instant, having the remainder of her cargo ready for shipment.

She will be in good sailing trim, has a full

crew, and is in every respect a first-rate con-

veyance for passengers; stern cabin very

spacious, and furnished with every con-

venience for families.

Apply to the Commander on board; or to

THACKER MASON AND CO., 403

BUCHANAN AND CO. 319

FOR LIVERPOOL.

THE first-class fast-sail-

ing brig,

SARAH BIRKETT.

202 tons register, Joseph

Proddow, commander. This vessel is now

ready to receive cargo, and having all her

heavy freight engaged, will have quick

despatch. For freight or passage apply to

GILCHRIST AND ALEXANDER, No. 700, George-street.

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BANK NOTICE.

COMMERCIAL BANKING COMPANY OF

SYDNEY.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that a

General Meeting of the Proprietors of this

Bank will be held on Tuesday, the 21st

instant, at twelve o'clock precisely, for the

purpose of receiving the Report of the Di-

rectors, and declaring a Dividend, for the

half year ending 31st ultimo, and for the

election of Directors, in the room of Robert

Scott, Esq., deceased, Roger Therry and James

Tod Goodair, Esquires, disqualified, also for

the election of general or special business, touching

the management and affairs of the Company,

as may be brought before the Meeting.

L. DUGUID, Managing Director.

Commercial Bank Office, Sydney, January 1, 1845.

UNTIL further notice, Tenders for

Bills of Exchange, to be drawn by the undersigned

for His Majesty's Treasury, at thirty days sight,

will be received at this Office every Thursday, at noon, the most favourable of

which, if approved of, will be accepted.

No Tenders will be received unless sealed, and in duplicate, marked "Tenders for Bills."

T. W. RAMSAY, Dep. Com. Gen.

THE SHIPPING GAZETTE.

AND

SYDNEY GENERAL TRADE LIST.

THE Forty-second Number of the

Shipping Gazette was published on Saturday, and will be continued every Saturday

Contents.—Arrivals and Departures of Shipping for the week; Clearances, Imports and Exports for the week; Coasters Inwards and Outwards; the Shipping Intelligence of the week, including News from the Outports, Port Phillip, Van Diemen's Land, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope, Manila, and Calcutta; Vessels laid on for England; Ships loading for England; Ships in Harbour; Colonial Whalers at Sea; Vessels expected in Sydney; Code of Signals, &c.; Despatch of Mails from Sydney, &c.; Tide Table, Commercial Remarks; Wool Market; Quantity of Spirits and Tobacco in Bond; Colonial Produce; Horses; Price Current, &c.

* Advertisements received for the above till ten o'clock on the mornings of publication. Terms same as for the Morning Herald.

One copy, per quarter 0 7 6
Two copies, ditto 0 12 0
Three copies, ditto 0 18 0
Four copies, ditto 1 0 0
Five copies, per annum 5 0 0
KEMP AND FAIRFAX, Proprietors.

EVERY DESCRIPTION OF BOOK AND JOB PRINTING

PERFORMED WITH accuracy and despatch, at low prices, by

KEMP AND FAIRFAX.

REMOVAL.

JOHN G. COHEN, Auctioneer and Agent, begs to inform his friends and the public that he has taken those central premises, formerly the Sydney Bank, George-street, (two doors south of Hunter-street), where he hopes to receive a continuance of those favours so liberally bestowed on him since his commencement in the above business.

Excellent dry Stores for every description of merchandise, which will be stored free of expense till the day of sale.

TO LET.
Two Offices on the first floor, well adapted for a public company, merchants, solicitors, &c. Private entrance, George-street. 8669

MANKROO.

SHEARING SUPPLIES.

THE Settlers in the District of Man-

eroo are informed, that they can be

furnished with all necessary shearing supplies at the Store, Boyd Town, Twofool Bay, at moderate prices:—

Tea Sugar Flour Tobacco Salt Soda

Corrosive sublimate Hardware Hardware

N. H. Sheep, cattle, hides, sheepskins wool, or tallow, delivered to the ship

taken in exchange, the distance from Hilbert's being forty miles, on an excellent road.

Every facility for the shipment of wool and produce by regular packets to Sydney.

TO SETTLERS AND OTHERS INTERESTED IN THE SALE OF COLONIAL PRODUCE.

R. FAWCETT, Auctioneer and

Sydney, opposite the Barrack Gate, begs re-

spectfully to inform settlers and others that he will sell Wool, Tallow, Hides, and other

Colonial Produce, at a Commission of ONE PER CENT.,

which is less than that charged by the London

brokers.

After the experience of last season, R. F. need not point out the advantage of this mode

of sale, as it was universally admitted that wool, &c., realized fully ten per cent. more by auction than by private sale.

In the rear of the present auction rooms there is an extensive store, which will be appropriated for the reception of colonial pro-

duce until the day of sale, for which no charge will be made; also a large yard, affording every facility for unloading drays, &c. 3436

COLONIAL PRODUCE.

THE undersigned begs to inform parties

interested in the sale of colonial produce, that he is prepared to make advances on wool,

tallow, hides, &c., intended either for private sale or public auction, and that he will store the same NINETY DAYS without charge

for rent. His spacious stores will admit up-

wards of 1000 bales of wool; and any quan-

tity of tallow and hides may be stored in his dry and cool cellars.

TO MEET THE TIMES, ONE PER CENT. COMMISSION will be charged for effecting the sale.

SAMUEL LYONS, Auctioneer.

George-street and Charlotte-place. 3400

CASH ADVANCED ON SHEEP AND CATTLE

TO THE STOCKHOLDERS OF BATHURST, WELLINGTON, WOODVILLE, THE NAMOI, BARRYN, BIG RIVER, &c. distant 25 miles from Bathurst, and five from Cullen

Bullen, where excellent paddocks are provided. A cash advance, to the extent of one half the Stock value, will be made on delivery; and the remainder will be paid on the quantity of tallow being ascertained.

Further particulars may be obtained on application at the establishment to Mr. J. R. Harrison, or to Mr. Sloman, Commandant, Agent, Bathurst.

GOULBURN MAIL.

Safe and Expeditious Travelling, with good conveyances and steady coachmen, four times per week.

LEAVING SYDNEY

On Tuesday, at 5 o'clock p.m., arriving at Goulburn on Wednesday, at 8 o'clock p.m.

Wednesday, at 5 o'clock p.m., arriving at Goulburn on Friday, at 3 o'clock p.m.

Friday, at 5 o'clock p.m., arriving at Goulburn on Saturday, at 8 o'clock p.m.

Saturday, at 5 o'clock p.m., arriving at Goulburn on Monday, at 3 o'clock p.m.

LEAVING GOULBURN

On Sunday, at 10 o'clock a.m., arriving in Sydney on Tuesday, at 8 o'clock a.m.

Tuesday, at 9 o'clock a.m., arriving in Sydney on Thursday, at 8 o'clock a.m.

Wednesday, at 10 o'clock a.m., arriving in Sydney on Friday, at 8 o'clock a.m.

Saturday, at 10 o'clock a.m., arriving in Sydney on Monday, at 8 o'clock a.m.

Booking Offices, at Mr. Titterton's, Talbot Inn, George-street, Sydney; Mr. Morris's Inn, Campbelltown; Mr. Moyle's, Mail Coach Hotel, Bathurst; Mr. Alex. Long's, Goulburn.

Fares, as usual.

JOSEPH H. JONES, Contractor.

KBENEZER COAL WHARF.

SUSSEX-STREET, AT THE BOTTOM OF MARKET-STREET.

THOMAS ROBINSON has the honour of informing the public generally, that having entered into most favourable arrange-

ments with the proprietors of the Ebenezer Works, he is enabled to ensure a constant supply to his friends, of the best and cheapest

coals shipped into the port of Sydney. It is unnecessary to state the high repute which has already been achieved in public estima-

tion in favour of these coals, not only as regards the absence of small lumps, but the durable nature of their burning, which has obtained for them a celebrity defying all competition.

T. R. solicits the support of his friends in sending their orders to the Depot, Ebenezer Coal Wharf, at the bottom of Market-street; or to his Establishment, George-street, next door to the Royal Hotel, where favours will be punctually attended to.

Terms—Cash on delivery.

Present Wharf Price, 10s. per ton of 28 bushels Town Delivery, 12s. 6d. ditto ditto

N.B. Liberal allowance by the cargo, and supplies by contract entered into.

THOMAS ROBINSON.

WHOLESALE AND RETAIL DRUG ESTABLISHMENT, KING-STREET.

ELDRIDGE, in returning his

sincere thanks to his friends and the public generally for the very liberal patronage

bestowed on him for the last six years, respectfully informs them that he has resumed

business at the old establishment, and hopes that by a personal attention to business, and care exercised in the selection of goods, to merit a share of their favours.

January 6.

LIST OF PRICES.

FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF SETTLERS AND THE PUBLIC (THE FEW ARTICLES PARTICULARISED BEING A SAMPLE FOR ALL THE REST.)

Super calicoes, 3s. 6d. per yard

Stout finished longcloths, 5d. to 6d. per yard

Extra stout white Wigan sheetings, from 4d. to 6d. per yard

8-4 grey sheeting, 10d. per yard

Stout cotton bed-tick, 9s. to 10s. per yard

Navy blue prints, 10s. 6d. per piece

Fancy printed dresses, full colours, at 3s. 6d. per dress

Superfine imported cambric ditto, at 5s. to 6s. 6d. per dress

Mousseline de laine dresses, from 4s. 6d. per dress

Printed muslin and white checked dresses, 4s. 6d. per dress

4s. 6d. fancy checks for children's dresses, 1s. per yard

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With regard to the investment of the money, we have lent £6000, 11 per cent. for 5 years, upon a property of my brother, on land, and a double house, and some other estate contained originally 4000 acres of land, situated on the banks of the River Hunter, about thirty miles from Maitland, but which has since been sold for £10,000. The residue, about 3000 acres, is the best part of the estate, containing the improvements, and is now let to a tenant for 21 years, at a rent of £1000, and I have advanced £4000 upon a second mortgage, so that before long I will receive either principal or interest.

On the 15th January, 1841, the defendant Barker wrote to plaintiff, announcing the completion of the mortgage to Sparks, for two years, at 12 1/2 per cent., in which he stated that he had received a large increase in the value of land during his absence from the colony, he writes as follows—

"My brother, who is left in possession of the

ness, of the idleness and expensive habits of this partner, of whom, however, he soon got rid after my arrival. The money market was in a disordered state, and he pressed me to advance some money, and offered an Estate in the County of the Sussex Road, as security. At the meeting it was unincumbered and of sufficient value, I did not hesitate to lend him some of my money, as I informed you, at 11 per cent. I was to have my money back in 1840, being £1000 more than I had intended. For this £1000 I have taken a second mortgage: both your money and my own are well and safely secured, indeed, as I before told you, I have no doubt that I shall never be paid off in full; yet had I known the exact position of my brother's affairs, I would not have advanced one sixpence of either your or my money. I have no doubt that I shall shortly be repaid by the trustees, but I shall have to look for a new investment; not that I doubt finding abundance of offers for it, yet the changing so soon, and the cause of it, I am sure you again that nothing can be more secure than your money at this moment, and indeed, situate as you are, and receiving it from you as I did, I consider the trust so sacred, that I should not have been so ready to have been available to you and your family for the amount;

In April, 1941, a remittance of £533 10s. was made to the plaintiff on account of the year's interest, due on the two mortgages - the first regular mortgage made by the defendant Barker, out of his own funds, remitted several sums to the plaintiff on account of the interest. Several other letters were written by Barker to the plaintiff, in which Barker regrets the depreciation of plaintiff's securities, and repeats his own readiness to be responsible for any loss which the plaintiff might incur.

The mortgages having become greatly in arrears, they were ultimately put up for sale, Barker's, on the 5th May, 1942, being purchased by defendants for £4010, and Barker's, (the second mortgage), on 12th July, 1942, for the same year, for £3000, being bought in at that price, as the bill states, "by or on behalf of the defendants, or purchased by the defendant, Thomas Barker." On the 12th July, 1942, the defendant Barker wrote to the plaintiff in reference to the above sales as follows: "With regard to my brother's estate, I put it up at auction, and there was not a single bidder. I therefore bought, and have since been holding it for a few years, hoping by a sale to realise my £6000, even should I lose my £6000. I am now endeavouring to let it. Supposing I cannot do so, and have to sell it for £3000, I must lose £8000 by this one transaction. With regard to the £6000 lent to my brother, I propose to give a mortgage on the Castle Forbes Estate, and to secure you for the £6000, and to pay you back the same in four years from the day of sale, paying on the interest at the rate of 5 per cent. I mention at the rate of 5 per cent, in consequence of the exceeding heavy loss I sustain in my brother's estate, and I am also in paying you interest on the £4000 lent Mr. Sparke, and by my determination to make up your £6000 lent on Castle Forbes. I am anxious to remit you the interest on the £6000.

The estate of Barker and Hallen paid a dividend of six shillings in the pound, out of which the defendants received on account of the plaintiff's share, being one-third of the estate, £2,000 in the £3,000, the remainder of the £6,000 being met by the sale of the mortgage. No part of this sum was remitted to the plaintiff, but an account was rendered to him, in which that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendants, in the matter of their agency, in the sum of £232 10s. 8d. This account appears to have been sent to the plaintiff in a letter on the 14th of March, 1842, and on the 15th of March, 1843, the defendant Barker again wrote to the plaintiff, desiring to be relieved of the management of the plaintiff's affairs, and at the same time to be relieved of the interest on the mortgage, inasmuch as that he had, in accordance with his previous promise, expended the sum of £1,000 for the plaintiff, to ensure him the payment of interest at 5 per cent. on £6,000, and the principal at the period of four years, should the estate of the plaintiff ever realize the money. Several letters, in answer to those of the plaintiff, were received from the plaintiff, who declined to have anything to do with the purchase of the estates, or to accept Mr. Barker's bond, but to have the mortgage paid off, and to give to him by a mortgage over Mr. Barker's own estate. The date of the plaintiff's last letter to Mr. Barker is the 20th October, 1843, and in it he desires Mr. Barker to hand over to his son Robert the mortgage of the property, and to give to his son Robert a power of attorney, observing that he required him to do so. Robert to act, in compliance with the defendant's wish to be relieved of the management of the plaintiff's affairs, expressed in his letter of the 5th of March, 1843.

These are the main facts of the case, as they appear on the stating part of the bill, which concludes with an allegation that the plaintiff has, "through the negligence and misconduct of the defendants as his agent, lost the whole of his principal money, and some arrear of interest."

shall allude to more particularly when I come to consider their effect; and concludes with a prayer for relief, of certainly a somewhat unusual and moved nature, of which I will say a few words in the way of comment. The prayer is in substance, which I do not say is entirely of opinion here, is entitled I do not say consistently with the case made by his bill. His prayer is "that the defendants may be directed to pay to the plaintiff the sum of £10,000, the sum of Barker and Hallen's dividend—that the plaintiff's money may be declared to have been lent by the defendants without due and proper care, diligence, and attention to the interests, and in and in consequence of the sum of £900 they to the said sum of £900 they may be decreed to pay sufficient to make up the sum of £10,000 with interest at the rates reserved in the respective mortgages, and that the said sums mentioned to have been remitted to him or received by his agents since then—that they may also pay up the arrears of interest on the said mortgages, and give to the plaintiff sufficient security for the said money, and for each other, or together with the said two mortgaged estates, be a good and sufficient security for the plaintiff's money, and for the regular payment of the interest on the said principal money of the said principal money, when and as the plaintiff shall require return thereof; and, that upon the said defendants should have paid up the said principal money on the said mortgaged premises should stand as a security."

The defendants have each put in a general demurrer to the bill, for want of equity; and also on the ground that there is no statement in the bill of the plaintiff's place of abode. The last objection may conveniently be disposed of first. The residence of the plaintiff in the bill is "Robert Gordon Down," Esq., and Professor of Botany, in the University of Edinburgh." It was argued that this was a sufficient description of the plaintiff's place of abode; but I think it is no description at all, and that it amounts at the most to a statement of the plaintiff's office. The objection to the objection to be valid on it was contended that it could not be taken advantage of by demurrer; but that the proper course was

to apply to the Court that the plaintiff might be entitled to a new jury for costs. This was said to be a new ground, and the Court said that it would not sit down in the different text books, on the plaintiff's chief of counsel, *Long*, 2 M. & K. 100. But although such a course might have been taken, the Court said that it was not necessary to follow that they are not entitled to a new jury. In *Snyder v. Long*, all that was decided was, that a defendant was not bound to plead or to answer to a bill of costs, and that he was not bound to get over in that case, was whether the defendant could take any other course. The Court said that it was not in favour of a demurrer in such a case, and that it was not in favour of the plaintiff to give such a course—and the Chancellor thought that there was no authority for the plaintiff to take such a course in the present case. It might, possibly, have succeeded to it, but I am not the least bound to follow the demurrer, if there be no authority in favour of such a course, and Rowley v. Eccles, 10 M. & St. 51, cited at the bar, is directly in point. That case the defendant demurred to, and the Court said that it was overruled, and that upon argument, and not on the ground that a

demurrer would not lie, for the defendant afterwards pleaded that the defendant did not reside at the place stated in the bill. This shows that the plaintiff had in fact stated his place, but not his true place of residence in the bill, and that the defendant was not entitled to the advantage of his demurrer. Had no place been stated, as in the case here, the demurrer would not have been overruled. On principle, indeed, a demurrer appears to be more proper where the court is to be bound that the plaintiff is guilty of some fraud, than where the fraud is apparent on the record, which, in *Lord Redeford's* treatise, and all others upon the subject, is assigned as an express ground of demurrer. (page 46; see also *12 Jur. 100*, p. 1, and *12 Jur. 100*, p. 1, and *12 Jur. 100*, p. 1, the latter is suggested; but the mode by which a demurrer is primarily pointed out, and from p. 46 of the 2nd vol. it is clear that a demurrer is consistent with the facts of the case, and that in all events I can find no authority that it is not so, and having been adopted in the present instance, and upon adequate grounds, I am of opinion that, upon this point, the demurrer

Upon so technical a point, however, should certainly not dismas this bill; but it will, of course, be fruitless to give the plaintiff leave to amend, if I am against him, upon the ground that the bill is defective in the demurrer. As to this, the defendants deny the equity of the plaintiff *in toto*, and the main ground upon which they have taken their stand is that the plaintiff's remedy is at law, and that he should, therefore, be barred by the statute of limitations. That is, that it is a bill for damages, and that the relief sought is founded on a case, which amounts only to a charge of negligence—without fraud—or with fraud too vaguely and imperfectly charged—and not distinctly connected with the negligence charged. The plaintiffs, however, insist that it is to be sufficiently alleged, they contend that not being trustees, but only agents, and so treated by the bill, they are not amenable in a Court of Equity. They claim, therefore, that the bill is not barred by the statute of limitations, and they found a claim to relief in Equity—these are nullified by other statements showing a case on which they may have a complete remedy at law—such as that the duplicate will be taken advantage of by the defendants, on the ground that where alternative or inconsistent statements are put forth in a bill, the opposite party has a right to adopt those which are most against the interest of the party making them. The bill is not defective in form, and the bill alone must be considered as the plaintiff's case, and that any defects therein could not be supplied by reference to the charging

The demurrer plaintiff's counsel contended that the truth of all the facts alleged in the plaintiff's bill, the charging part could not be excluded—therefore, the demurrer should be overruled. The purpose of entitling the plaintiff to an answer, and that at all events, a case of gross negligence was stated—which, as against a trustee, was actionable. There was, in principle, no distinction between the two cases, and that wherever a reliance was placed on the conscience of the party, there Equity had jurisdiction—that the plaintiff was entitled to discovery, and that the bill stated facts which, if true, were, as a matter of law, yet if he had it also in Equity the Court would afford it him to do justice and avoid multiplicity of suits—that at all events the bill was not defective in form, and that as accounting parties—and that if relief could be given them on this or any other head, consistently with the case made by the bill, all relief should be granted. Specifically prayed, the demurrer could not succeed.

The diligence of the learned counsel who argued the various points supplied me with a variety of cases, which left little to be added on the subject of the pleading. I have, however, hereafter to the distinction which it was contended should be made between the stating and charging parts of the bill. The case relied on by the defendants was that of *Finch v. Field*, 10 Ves. 325. In that case the plaintiff laid down, that "the plaintiff's equity must appear in the stating part of the bill." The case itself is stated in almost as few words as the case of *Finch v. Field* is reported. From that decision appears to me that the equity deduced in the case cited by the counsel for the plaintiff of *Houghton v. Reynolds*, 2 Hare, 264. There the Vice-Chancellor said, "I do not intend to say that the defendant's answer is not an authority for the proposition, that a fact introduced by way of charge in the bill is not as well pleaded as if it were introduced in the statement; but technically charged in statement; it merely defines the allegation, and the defendant sets up certain pretences, followed by a charge that the contrary of such pretences is the truth, is not of itself an allegation, but a charge, and the defendant must answer the counter-statement. I have no doubt that such a form of pleading—not specially averring the facts themselves, would be defective; but there is no rule that every material fact must be stated in the charging part of the bill."

It should be observed that in *Flint v. Field* the whole equity of the plaintiff's case consisted in the pretences, and charges to the contrary; which latter not operating as specific denials, the court found the case to fail altogether without equity. It is hardly an authority for saying that the plaintiff's equity must appear in the stating part of the bill, but rather that if the equity appears only in the charging part, the case will fail. The equity, *must be there stated affirmatively*, and not merely by denial of the truth of the defendant's pretences to the contrary. But in the charging part of the present bill, there is not only a denial of the truth of the defendant's distinct averments of facts in support of that denial, and of the case made by the bill; and these facts, however material, the case justifies in not stating; but the equity must appear in the stating part of the bill. What the case made by the bill in conjunction with the charges in support of it, will amount to, is the *substantial* question raised by the demurrer; but I am not prepared to say that the equity of a part of the plaintiff's bill must be taken as part of his case—and I think that it must. Whether that case will entitle him to relief in another question, and which, having determined what the facts to be considered, I now proceed to inquire.

The object of this bill is to make the defendants responsible for a breach of trust; with that view the prayer is framed, and to that end the allegations and charges are adapted. If the ground is taken that the bill is not a contract, there is no other: for it is in vain to say that this is a bill for an account. In the first place no account is prayed; and if it were, no ground is laid for such a prayer. There is no doubt that every principal has a right to an account from his agent, but that is not the ground on which the bill is framed, but the bill must be appropriately framed. The cases cited at the bar, of *Frietas v. Santos*, 1 Y. and J. 376—*King v. Rossett*, 2 Y. and J. 34—and *Darthes v. Lee*, 2 Y. and C. 10, show that the mere relation of principal and agent is not a just ground for an account. The grounds of the principal's coming into Court for relief must be stated; and these grounds, generally, are—"either if the opposite party refuses to account, or there is a difficulty in taking the account, or some disadvantage is taken, or some fraud is alleged to be taken." Nothing of the sort is alleged here.

So far, indeed, from its being stated that the defendants have not accounted, or have delivered false or incorrect accounts, or have rendered any account at all, that the plaintiff's own statement that they *have* accounted, and for anything that is stated to the contrary, accounted satisfactorily. No account is alleged to have been rendered by them since the time of furnishing the account, when they bring in the plaintiff as their debtor; after which period the agency was continued, and the plaintiff is now acknowledging the receipt of this account, the plaintiff makes no objection to it, nor does he now seek to impeach any of the items. But the fact that the plaintiff has received this account: for independently of more substantial omissions, there is not even the usual allegation of unsold accounts, or of applications for payment, or of any other thing that appears to be due to the plaintiff if an account is taken: on the contrary, the applications stated to have been made to the defendants, are stated to have been refused. The only relief asked by the prayer, "to invest and indemnify" It is part of the prayer, indeed, that the defendants may pay over the \$9000 to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff may restore—but that is not on the footing of an

item due in the way of account', but as part of the relief asked for against them—on the footing of their responsibility for breach of trust. As matter of account, it is included in the account furnished to the plaintiff—and that shows a balance in favour of the defendants. How, then, until that account is impeached, can I deal with this £900 as an item to be paid over to the plaintiff; or why am I to infer the balance made out in favour of the defendants to be incorrect, when the plaintiff himself does not allege so; but rather states that from which the contrary may be inferred?

It was argued, however, that independent of the question of account, a principal had a right to demand information from his agent, he was aware of discovery of the Subtler-Gibson case. In support of this view, relied much on a passage in Mackenzie v. Johnson, 4 Mad. 376, where the Vice-Chancellor says, "the plaintiff can only recover if he can show that the defendants, when they have acted in the execution of the agency; and it would be most unreasonable that he should pay them for that discovery, if he has not been made aware of it by the defendant; yet such must be the case, if a bill for relief will not lie. The case in which this observation occurs *resolves* for an account, and a proper case having been made out for discovery, the plaintiff is entitled to it, and it is clear that the plaintiff was also entitled to relief. As to any other information which a principal may require from his agent, touching his actings in the execution of his agency, equity is undoubtedly open to him for the purposes of discovery, and of relief too, where the relief is incidental to that discovery, and of the kind that can be administered in equity, although the plaintiff is not entitled to a bill for such discovery as establishing this, of which Ryle v. Hargrave, 1 F. & W. 231, is the principal one, is recognised in Poore v. Crewcock, 2 Haro. 266; although it is not necessary to recall the necessity of coming to equity for discovery, and the necessity of carrying with it the right of relief. But admitting the general right of a principal to discovery for such account, relief, if, being entitled to discovery alone, he is denied relief, a demurrer to the relief will be also a bar to the discovery. This is now too clearly established for any doubt upon the subject, although the contrary has been contended for, and has been very repugnant to law and practice, and which has been uniformly overruled. If in the present case, therefore, the plaintiff is discovered to receive without account the consequences of the demurrer, by bringing up his right to discovery on the ground of its being sought by a principal from his agent.

This brings me to the substantial question whether the relief prayed is demurrable, or whether it is proper to grant it. The bill is entirely within the case made by the bill? The case was argued on two grounds,—negligence, and fraud; and the answer given to the first was, that the remedy was at law. Assuming, for the present, that fraud be out of the question, it appears to me that the remedy would be solely at law—and I agree with Mr. Lowe that there are numerous charges in this bill, from which the plaintiff might select, and on which he might be framed against these defendants. That upon the facts stated in this bill such an action would lie, (if authority were wanted for the proposition,) is a question which I do not wish to discuss. *See* *Wheeler v. Wheeler*, 2 Bro. and Bing. 72. In order, however, to escape from being driven to law, it was contended for the plaintiff, that the defendants were to be looked upon as trustees, and that they were liable in Equity for neglect of duty—as well as at law.

It was contended that there was no difference in principle between an agent and a trustee, and that the defendants in the present case are as much amenable to Equity jurisdiction, in respect of the duty undertaken by them as if that duty had been created by will, or had under any other instrument been made the duty of a trustee. It was further contended that it was immaterial whether the defendants were styled agents or trustees in the bill, or whether the transaction in respect of which they were sought to be made liable was termed an agency or a trust, and that the bill was sufficient to set out the case made by the bill warrants the imputation of the character sought to be established against the defendants, it will not shut its eyes to that fact, because the appropriate term which may or may not have been applied, is not an objection thereto. It is sufficient that the bill will prevent any dealing with these defendants in connection with the transaction.

dents as trustees, if they appear to me to be so, from the case made by the bill. But I cannot say as an equitable proposition, that there is no confidence. Equity is not a law of agents and a trustee. For some purposes, indeed, they stand on the same footing as to discovery, there is little, if any, difference between them. But in this case, as has been mentioned, that discovery will follow by relief, but I am yet to learn that every case for relief against a trustee will be a case for relief against an agent. The ground of intervention is not the same. It is not necessary, undoubtedly a confidence reposed by one party in the conscience of another; but if this definition were to be literally followed, there is hardly any transaction in life in which one party is not to be considered as reposing confidence in the skill or integrity of another. The exercise of skill or integrity is expected or pledged—that might not be construed to be a trust. The case of a solicitor was suggested by Mr. Lowe—take too that of a surgeon or physician, or a tradesman, or a manufacturer, inviting deeper confidence, or requiring greater conscientiousness,—yet if the one be misplaced, or the other violated, there is no pretence for coming to a court of Equity, and the other party must seek redress in the ordinary tribunals. Between the mere confidence in the integrity of another for the performance of a duty must exist in a transaction which is made the subject of an appeal for relief to a court of Equity, and the breach of a trust, and that something apert to the breach, *the absence of a remedy at law*. Let it be borne in mind that I am now speaking of a breach of faith in regard to the manner of executing the duty, and not of a breach of duty itself, which arises by a party's taking undue advantage of the confidence reposed in him for the performance of that duty, to benefit himself. The latter kind of breaches are in Equity considered as breaches of duty, and the party who commits them would be equally liable as a trustee; in other words, to the extent of the benefit improperly derived by him through the confidence reposed

in trust, he would become, and be declared, a trustee for his principal. But to place an agent in that position fraud is necessary—gross negligence, though it would suffice against a trustee, is not sufficient against Aim. In the present case it is insisted that the defendants are trustees, and therefore gross negligence is all that need be charged against them,—but to call them trustees, and thus avoid the necessity of proving fraud, is a begging of the question, since, in my view of the case, until they are fixed with fraud, they cannot be considered as trustees in the sense in which that word is ordinarily understood in a Court of Equity.

That it is of the essence of a trust, to be exclusively the subject of Equitable Jurisdiction, is obvious from the use of the word itself; and it is equally obvious, that the law is not to be applied when obligation exists, the law is sufficient to compel performance, or give redress for non-performance, or malperformance; but when confidence is the ground of the duty, and the law is not sufficient to give redress, Equity is the appropriate and only remedy. It is a good test then of the character of a party sought to be dealt with as a trustee, to see whether the trust is in respect of which he is charged, is capable of affording a remedy at law. In almost every case where relief has been given against a party as trustee, (with the exception of that acknowledged class of cases in which the law is not sufficient to be resorted to,) it will be found that no remedy could have been had at law. Authority is hardly necessary to prove the proposition; but among the dicta of a similar description to be found in the works of the great authorities, see, e. g., Sturt v. Mellish, 2 Atk. 612, in which he says: "A trust is when there is such a confidence "between parties that no action at law will lie: "it is a confidence, merely for the generation "of Equity;"—which, it is meant, is the thing, that where an action at law will lie, it is not a case for the consideration of a Court of Equity. The cases cited then to show that the parties in the present case were trustees, in trusts, similar to those charged against these defendants, do not apply—for in all of them the parties were trustees by their very situation, or had become so by their own acts, and the law was not sufficient to give redress in the case fell within that admitted class, in

which a Court of Equity exercises concurrent jurisdiction. But the negligence complained of here, is the negligence of a paid agent, which is very different from the characters filled by the respective defendants in the cases I allude to, among which I include the two so much relied on by the Solicitor-General of *Massey v. Banner*, 4 Mad. 413, and *Langton v. Ollivant*, Cooper 33.

Laurens v. Bridges and Christy, Finch's Precedents 147, is a case not altogether dissimilar to this. There, a sum of £1000 belonging to the testator, was bequeathed to the defendant, the defendant's testator, with a request that he would put it out on security; he lent it on a pre-encumbered mortgage, and to a person in great difficulties, circumstances he might have foreseen. The defendant was obliged to pay a bill being filed against his executors to make good the money, it was dismissed, and the decree was affirmed upon appeal, on the ground that there was nothing to charge the defendants with fraud. The Lord Chancellor said, "I think the testator had done altogether what in natural justice he ought to have done; and it was in evidence that he himself had and he thought himself obliged in conscience to do so."

All that I have now been saying still leaves open the question of fraud—for a Court of Equity will not permit any person to take undue advantage of the confidence reposed in him by another, and to convert that confidence into an obligation for the due performance of which the party is responsible to all. For this purpose principal and agent are looked upon in the same light as *certes qui testis et trustee*. The main question is, whether the defendant, in this bill, as it now stands, is whether the defendants appear to have taken a fraudulent advantage of their position as agents to benefit themselves, to the prejudice of the plaintiff, their principal, or to the detriment of the public, so that the relief claimed against them might be given on the ground of negligence only—and that might be the case, if the bill were framed under the circumstances of the case, and the allegations of those charges which were relied on as allegations of fraud. Certainly in the stating part of the bill, with the exception of one passage expressive of the plaintiff's suspicion of fraud, and one of the plaintiff's charge of negligence. But in the event of this failing, his counsel relied on the case as one of fraud, and the facts averred as indicative of this, it was not necessary to set out the bill as framed with the plaintiff; but if these facts appear only in the charging part, they must be

[illegible]

But, in the first place, it is not averred in any one part of the bill, that the defendants, at the time of taking the security in question, *knew* them to be, or had information that they were, impostors; on the contrary, it is averred, that the defendants, on this demurrer must be presumed to have known that the persons who stood forth for him as against him, show the most implicit, and, for aught that appears, *bona fide* reliance on their sufficiency. But however this may be, the plaintiff's case is not made out, on the contrary. The main allegations relied upon in proof of fraud—so far as relates to the larger advance—are chiefly these—that the £6000 lent to Thomas Barker, was not paid directly, came back into the pocket of Mr. Thomas Barker; that with this money or part of it, he was enabled to effect a dissolution of partnership between his brother and Mr. Hallen, and to carry on the business of a miller, for the benefit of Mr. Thomas Barker, either wholly or partially—that this business had been originally carried on by Thomas Barker, by his brother, and was left in charge to Thomas's departure for England—that Thomas Barker was connected in pecuniary and other transactions with Barker and Hallen at the time of the above loan—that Thomas Barker was not in England during his stay in England;—that these were embarrassed circumstances, and known to Thomas Barker to be so, previously to his taking the agency of the plaintiff; and that he forbore to disclose the very circumstances on his arrival in Sydney; and, nevertheless, within a fortnight afterwards, advanced to the one of them £6000 of the plaintiff's money.

Equally similar, so far as regards the inadequacy of the security—the knowledge by the defendants of its insufficiency—the haste and negligence in making the advance—and the benefit which the defendants derived from the advance—directly or indirectly to derive from it, other than their own commission.

Now if these charges are attentively considered, it will be seen that they consist of nothing more than an allegation of the happening of certain facts, which, if true, would establish at the same time that they discharged their duty to their principal, they were enabled to derive some other benefit than that belonging to their position as agents. I say, discharged their duty, because, if the facts alleged are true, the kind of security taken, was in itself no breach of trust, but was done in conformity with the powers confided to them. In this view of the matter, the insolvency of the mortgagors—the fact of their having been deceived by the purposes to which it was applied—are immaterial to the question of fraud. Supposing the security had been as valid as it is now alleged to be defective—these circumstances could not be pleaded in excuse of the defendants to the plaintiff, and the fact of its having failed can make no difference in the position of the defendants, if, which is not alleged, they did not know it to be inadequate. There is no allegation that the defendants were ignorant of the transaction with J. Barker was a cloak for the part of T. Barker, to obtain the loan himself, giving James a part of it, in consideration of his furnishing the security as a cover to conceal the true nature of the transaction. If this was so, it was a delict really done from J. to T. Barker, and not

was paid back to him out of the advance was a design to give it the appearance only of a debt. All that is said is, that James was Thomas's debtor, and that the latter did in fact get paid the advance from the advance made on behalf of the plaintiff. The second mortgage, by which he became second mortgagee on the same security as that on which the £6000 was invested, is charged to have been made out of the sum paid by the latter loan; but the admission is not denied. It is true in the charge, that the plaintiff was not concerned in the conduct, it is alleged that this redundancy was either not made at all, or was made to give a fictitious appearance of value to the security, or was a debt already due, or was made out of the sum advanced by the plaintiff and paid to the defendant out of the same avancements, as they are put alternatively in the charge. It is titled to adopt whichever is most favourable to him; and it he adopts either of the two last

the advance itself will stand unimpugned. The existence of these facts then being in themselves consistent with *bona fides*, some connection must be shown between them and the fraudulent design attributed to the defendants, before I can put upon them any other than an innocent construction. A design was certainly attributed to the defendants, but on looking attentively through the charges that design

appears to be rather insinuated than alleged, and is, as unconnected with the particular facts attributed as the facts themselves are with the charge of fraud. In the stating part of the bill, that is, in the *recital*, the *facts* are stated, and the *allegations* that the advances were made in fraud of him, and to the intent that the whole, or part, should directly or indirectly come back to, or be for the benefit of the defendants; and that the advances were made under the influence of some motive other than a due and single regard to the interest of plaintiff." As to this, suspicion can do for nothing, even if the charge of suspicion is itself not altogether vaguely stated, with as an imputation of fraud. The same vagueness and generality pervades the charging part of the bill—in one part it is charged that the respective advances were made to the defendants, or to their attorneys, or the defendants, or one of them directly, or indirectly, rather than with a true and impartial single regard to the interests of the plaintiff; in another, "that the defendants, and particularly the defendant, *James*, intended, or expected, to derive some direct or indirect benefit or advantage from the loan of £5000, other than the commission upon remittances to the plaintiff;" and, again, the same is charged of the defendant, *James*, as regards to the loan of £1000. These charges appear to me, are much too general and hypothetical; and, it will be observed, in no way connect the defendants with the specific acts, or the specific intentions, of which the charge of fraud. The general charges speak of expectation and intention—but nothing of scheme—plot—concoct—or design; and even these expectations, or intentions, are not linked with the overt acts to which they are intended to refer. It is possible that those acts may have been the result of a fraudulent design; but it is not averred so. I see what is pointed at in the charge, perhaps, that is intended, but the mark is not hit, and the officer is left for me to recognize it. In this respect the case very much resembles the *East India Company v. Henchman*, 1 Ves. Jun. 287, cited by Mr. Donoghue, in which a somewhat similar fraud was disclaimed by the defendant.

A very ingenious turn to one part of the bill

was given by Mr. Foster, who argued that the defendant Barker having persuaded the plaintiff to employ him instead of Edwards and Hunter, it was his own business, it was a fraud in him to accept the money, because he himself was, from his connection with his brother, in the same position as Edwards and Hunter. I agreed that if any such case were made out, it would be a fraud. It was alleged that Mr. Barker, by representing himself as a business, or as having no pecuniary concerns with his brother, had induced the plaintiff to appoint him his agent, and by means of this appointment to receive the money belonging to the plaintiff's money—any dealing with this money would have been a fraud which I am inclined to think Equity would have laid hold of. But in the present case no such representation was made, and the fact that the money was so received appears; it is true that the plaintiff must have supposed Mr. Barker was not in business—but does not appear that he was. All that is said is, that his brother was largely indebted to him, and that he was largely indebted to him, and that he was largely indebted to him. All this is consistent with Mr. Barker's being another business man, and not a partner in his brother and Hallen in charge of the same business, and that they, during his absence, and on his return, were largely indebted to him. All this is consistent with Mr. Barker's being another business man, and not a partner in his brother and Hallen, and from Mr. Barker's own letters the contrary is to be inferred. Where, then, I ask, is the fraudulent design? It is not enough to say generally that the defendants had no authority to receive the money, but will the case be carried any further by the allegation of particular facts, unless those facts are connected in such a manner with the fraud as to show the existence of design. Expectation and hope are not to be taken from by an agent, which is in itself no breach of trust, followed though it be by fraud, cannot surely amount to fraud. Even

trust property by trustees is only so far a fraud that the purchase will not be allowed to derive any profit from his bargain. It is not a dishonest dealing with the principal's moneys here, but a dealing with the trust itself, *not made any stipulation connected with the acquisition*, by which they are to receive anything beyond their commission, nor any advantage from the transaction, but to give the beneficiaries the benefit. Supposing it became the duty of a trustee to purchase instead of to sell, would it be in itself a fraud to buy from his principal, or might he justly expect and hope to receive payment out of the purchase money? A refined sense of honour, or an over cautious or scrupulous mind, might make a man hesitate in such a transaction, but as the Lord Chancellor has said, it is not a fraud to buy from one's principal, and it is not a fraud to sell to him. The question in these matters is: 'not whether the transaction be such as a man of honour would disdain and disdain, or a man of delicacy refuse to do, but whether it is a fraud within some settled definition of the law, and not a *"Court."* The question here is whether the defendants have acted *unconscientiously*—whether or they have circumvented their principal in order to obtain for themselves a portion of the benefit themselves; not whether they have acted with delicacy, caution, or prudence. Negligence, I have already said, is sufficiently a fraud upon them,—but looking at their character of agents,—and bearing in mind the principles upon which such persons become liable as trustees—the kind of fraud which will render them so, and the manner in which that fraud is to be proved, it is not open to say that upon this point no sufficient case is disclosed by this bill against these defendants.

I am unwilling to give my decision on this most important part of the case without referring to two cases, not cited at the bar, of *Flyer v. Flyer*, 3 Bevan, 50, and *Rotschild v. Rothschild*, 10 Bevan, 107. In neither of these cases in order that the owners of the plantations may have the benefit of them on appeal, if it be thought they should have led me to a different conclusion. The case in High was that the defendant, who was a partner in the purchase of a third person, but a losing stock for his principal of third person, but a losing stock for himself, and a loss having subsequently accrued upon it, the agent was decreed to make it good. In *Flyer v. Flyer* money had been advanced to the defendant on an unauthorised security, and some of the debtors had been subsequently having gained an advantage by the payment of a debt due to them out of the advance, it was contended that they, as well as the trustees, were entitled to the benefit of the loss, on the ground of their knowledge of the loss, and the agent on a security not authorised by the trust, and the Court held that if the knowledge and design attributed had been made out, the trustees could not have been equally liable with the trustees, and with the agent, as it will be seen, to have with the principles upon which I decide the present one—the first being the case of a direct purchase by the agent of the principal, and the second, a dealing with a third person, and in the latter manner which in itself constituted a breach of trust. Both cases, however, contain dicta, which deserve attention, though when taken together, *prope in materia*, they furnish, as it appears to me, no argument in favour of the present bill.

I might, perhaps, leave the case here; but there is one point of view in which it was put by Mr. Lowe, that, if tenable, would have rendered the consideration of any other unnecessary. Mr. Lowe contended that the case was *res judicata*, and, as to give the defendants the option of meeting the case on the ground of a case being shown at law, although it might also have disclosed one in equity. Now, certainly, a very clear case is shown, in my opinion, for an action at law, although it is mixed up with suggestions which I more readily accept than I do the others. I am inclined to think that the bill, though I admit it may be framed with a double object, is a bill with a *doubtful* aspect is a very different thing. I think upon this bill a defendant is entitled to say, that as a clear case is stated which is the subject of relief at law—that as he has a right to a complete defence to this, though prayed for, of the nature of damages—

The cases of *Vernon v. Vernon*, 2 M. & C. 145, and *Halls v. Margrave*, 3 Beav. 284, are illustrations of the rule of construction against a pleader, in regard to inconsistent or uncertain statements in a bill. The plaintiff's bill stated that he was entitled to the property in dispute so loosely and doubtfully worded as to admit of a twofold inference, and a demurrer by the defendant was therefore allowed upon the ground that he was entitled to put that which he chose upon the defendant, and that, in such case, the plaintiff was bound to show that which was most against the interest of the person making them. In the other case the plaintiff having stated that he was "seised or otherwise entitled," and a legal claim being necessary to establish his claim, it was held that he was to that under the words "otherwise entitled," it was open to the defendant to contend that the plaintiff had an equitable title only, and a demurrer was accordingly allowed upon this ground.

In *Edwards v. Edwards*, Jacob's Rep. 335, a plaintiff filed a bill stating an alternative case of a title at law or in Equity—and the Lord Chancellor, on appeal, ruled that a demurrer could be taken to both parts of the bill, and that the plaintiffs ought to state distinctly whether their case was at law or in Equity. These cases were I believe referred to at the bar, but there is a stronger one upon the point, among the cases cited by the Lord Chancellor, which I allude to Williams v. Flight, 5 Bea. 103, which appears to me to be an authority for saying, that if case is so stated on a bill as in one view of it to entitle a party to equitable relief, and in another, to relief at law, upon which the plaintiff has a right to insist, that either ground he pleases; and, consequently, if he chooses, tie down the plaintiff to the case capable of being remedied at law. "I agree," says the Master of the Rolls, in the case just cited, that the plaintiff may state alternative allegations; and the plaintiff would not be obliged to elect if one be admitted, but would not if the other be adopted, then the defendant has a right to take his choice of the allegations. I think the principle which applies to a case with a double aspect, if the case is stated that it is, if one of those aspects present a case for law. I think the defendant may adopt this and refuse to recognise the other. But, as I before observed, this seems to me a bill rather with a double aspect, than a bill with two aspects in that, a demurrer would hold on in the ground of uncertainty and vagueness, as in the cases just mentioned, and that cited by Mr. Donnelly, of Wormald de Lisle, 10 Bea. 19. It is unnecessary to consider this particularly, as I have already taken relief as being in the nature of damages, after the decision I have come to on the other points, but the cases cited by Mr. Fisher, of Clifford v. Burke, 15 Ves. 123, and Glennie v. Inri, 3 Y. 10, are equally applicable to be authorities in favour of this objection.

I upon the whole then, for the different reasons above given, I think that the demurrer of each defendant must be allowed. In arriving at this conclusion I have been guided by the fact, as I have said, that the bill, as it is framed, seems to be apprehended by one of the learned counsel for the plaintiff, will be felt by that portion of the English public who are in the habit of sending out pecuniary investments to foreign countries, to be a bill which will not be in my power to extend protection to persons in the situation of the plaintiff, upon principles different from those applicable to other suits, and that the public will be in a better situation, I confess myself unable to discover. No one, it must be admitted, can fail to sympathise with the misfortunes of the plaintiff as they are stated in this bill, but hard as his case may be, I think that the public at large, if the public if a judge were capable of being led away by emotion or expediency to make an unauthorised decision. That the one at which I have been alluding is the one which is not the presumption to deny, but I believe it may be my own judgment. I trust I shall never be deterred from the due and full exercise of it, by any consideration of the comments it may excite. I have only to add, that this case was very ably argued, and that whatever may have seemed to be my impressions during the argument, I have been confirmed in my present conclusion without the most attenuated exception of all the points taken, and cases cited, on either side. The result is, that the demurrer of each defendant must be allowed, and this bill dismissed with costs.

THEOLOGICAL WARFARE.—A number of the most distinguished ministers of the non-Episcopalian denominations are carrying on a warfare against Episcopacy. It operates perhaps differently from what the rev. gentlemen intend; for we are credibly informed that a large number of them, who have heretofore been connected with the Unitarians and Congregationalists, are withdrawing from the Episcopal Church. The Rev. Dr. Cox is now giving a course of lectures in New York against Episcopacy, and the Rev. Dr. Woods, of Andover, has come out with a work in which he attempts to prove Episcopacy unscriptural. The former has two sons who are Episcopal clergymen, and the latter a son and a son-in-law that are Episcop-

[illegible]

A SHARP REBUKE.—A nobleman, of whom it may be truly said that his habits do honour to his station, his heart, to his country, and his conduct to his friends, has been lately elected to a high office, and is about to deliver an address to an English subject can attain, and his fortune suited to his condition. He has a large family; the eldest his son and heir, being at the head of a regiment of Horse Guards. Rumours having reached him that the young soldier had fallen into the hands of the Israelites, he sent for him, and spoke to him in the following manner:—“I hear you have borrowed money of the Jews, and have your brothers' and sisters' fortunes to invest, which I should be glad to put out at a fourth per cent. interest; I have the whole of my fortune at my disposal, and will allow five per cent., and be at no loss in showing the security you propose, as I am satisfied as to your title to the estates on which the loan has been advanced. I recommend this style of doing business to you, and I am sure it is a short, sharp, and decisive.” they way in which man's warfare should ever be carried on, and with the species or the specie. *Hyde Marston.*

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